The results of the pilot study suggest that military leaders do not have
a full understanding of the roles, use, and management of public affairs
assets. The role of the public affairs practitioner is to manage
internal and external communications as well as media relations. Using
the public affairs officer correctly entails inclusion and input in the
planning process from the beginning. The management portion deals
with the career management of the public affairs practitioners. This
includes training as well as providing the same professional opportunities
as the other military professions.
Due
to the perceptions of the leadership about public affairs found in stage
one of this analysis (Allen et al., 1999), the PA career field is in a
constant struggle to gain credibility within the military ranks.
There are numerous examples to support this idea, even in Hollywood.
A scene the movie the Manchurian Candidate (1962) features an intelligence
officer who was captured and tortured in Korea. As a result he is
having recurring nightmares, drinking heavily, and mishandling sensitive
material. His commanding officer notices his decline and is concerned
about his mental well-being. To solve the problem, the commander
transfers the officer to public affairs suggesting that PA is a place for
rest and recuperation. It is true that this movie is dated and things may
have changed, but there are current examples that suggest PA is not viewed
as a legitimate profession. A similar example actually occurred in the
early 1990s at Cameron Station, Virgina, when a Department of Army employee
suffered a nervous breakdown and as a result lost her top secret clearance.
She could no longer remain in her position so the command placed her into
public affairs.
And even
more recently a high-profile example can be found in the career of Monica
Lewinsky of the famed White House sex scandal. She was placed at
the highest level of military public affairs without military public affairs
training. This is not meant to be a political commentary nor does
this literature wish to suggest that she did not do a commendable job with
regards to public affairs. The point is however, she was not properly
trained yet was placed in a position with the potential to have a major
impact on the DOD mission. The Starr Report (1998) suggests that Monica
Lewinsky was virtually dumped into the position because the White House
felt she was a threat. This is a prime example of how the military,
either willingly or politically selects, trains, and promotes public affairs
assets.
Given the
findings of the pilot study, the experiment conducted with military leadership
should yield similar results. If the pre-test does find a poor perception
of PA among the leadership, then this only confirms what the pilot study
suggests. However, if the experiment concludes that a significant
variance exists between the control and treatment groups, then this opens
the door for large-scale changes in the way the military manages public
affairs. But because the military is a large bureaucratic structure, the
need for change is not always sufficient to generate change and additional
requirements may include funding, time and manpower. With this in
mind, proposals were developed based on time and resource requirements
necessary to implement the changes, as well as applicable communication
theories. The theories used are diffusion of innovation, agenda setting
and compliance gaining. These theories were chosen because they best
support the objectives of the research.
The proposals
are based on the pilot study and projected results of the experiment and
are divided into internal and external categories. Internal includes those
individuals in the PA community and external are those working within the
DOD, but outside the PA field. The external audience can also be
described as those using PA services or customers. The proposals are further
divided into short and long-term objectives. All of the objectives are
measurable and will increase the understanding of the roles, uses, and
management of PA professionals. If any one of the objectives is not accomplished,
the overall goal can still be attained through the other stated objectives.
This is done to ensure the success of the campaign throughout the services.
Short-term
internal
The short-term
objectives are defined as those actions to be accomplished in 12 months
or less and the long term is any action that occurs outside of one year.
The first
short-term objective is to brief the results of the experiment as well
as the suggestions to the four PA general officers in each of the services.
This diffusion strategy seeks to generate feedback and generate adoption
of the research proposals by the PA leadership. With their support,
adoption is more likely and should occur more quickly.
Our second
objective is to brief the results and proposals at each services’ Worldwide
PA Conference. Attendees include middle and upper management within
the PA community, and this will generate support among the PA practitioners
who implement the DOD policies and practices. This diffusion strategy
is critical to the campaign’s success because without the support of the
leadership in the PA community, any attempt to change the community will
fail.
The third
short-term internal objective uses Compliance-gaining Theory to help build
internal credibility by avoiding mistakes in the PA community. The
proposal is to have services establish a PA website specifically for lessons
learned and divided by subjects so PAOs can quickly reference such topics
as media on the battle field, Annex F preparation and crisis communication,
like the Center for Army Lessons Learned website. The creation and management
of the site is internal, however the success of the site relies on the
support of the external audience. This is a limitation because the
services may not want their mistakes published and therefore only favorable
lessons learned would be reported. On the converse, many of the lessons
learned occur on a large scale and during graded training exercises so
the lessons are public regardless of intent. However, using Miller
et al. (1977) rewards strategy, all lessons learned will be published with
non-attribution so as not to undermine a person, unit or service and the
site will have a clear purpose of improving the services.
The final,
proposal in this section uses Agenda Setting and entails airing two-minute
spots on Armed Forces Radio and Television networks. The spots would
focus on the utilities of public affairs. Although this would reach
a limited audience, the resource requirements are relatively low and repetition
is quite high.
Short-term external
The external recommendations are more difficult to implement because it
requires the support of non-PA leaders in the military. To build
the necessary support, compliance-gaining steps are used in showcasing
the positive aspects of good public affairs while addressing the negative
results of bad public affairs.
The first
proposal addresses the assignment of PA as an additional duty. Additional
duty means that a servicemember has a primary job and is given PA as an
additional responsibility without guidance or training. Due to resources
and the military structure, this additional duty status cannot be avoided
in most cases. But the action does suggest that PA is not a functional
field and anyone can accomplish the PA mission successfully with minimal
effort and little or no training. Given this, a proposal is made that all
servicemembers given PA as a collateral duty also be given appropriate
training which currently exists at the Defense Information School, Fort
Meade, Maryland. The course is a two-week reserve-officer’s course
held throughout the year and it could be expanded to include active-duty
leadership with very little cost to the commands. This would serve
two purposes. The first is that mistakes resulting from untrained
PAOs would be avoided serving as a type of reward to the commands, thus
generating compliance (Miller, 1977). The second is a greater understanding
of the role of the PAO. The required training also lends credibility
to the PA profession by establishing a norm that PAOs must be trained in
their craft.
The
second proposal requires DOD to agree to phasing PAO training into the
leadership schools. PA training already exists in some high-level
officer courses, however, the majority of the training addresses management
of the media. This proposal suggests expanding the training in two
ways. First by making it available in junior-level leadership courses
throughout the services and second by broadening the scope to address the
other aspects of PA. These two steps assist in the diffusion process
by exposing the military leadership to positive PA information.
The final short-term external objective is to convince the Army leadership
to give public affairs a branch status. Currently, an Army officer
cannot serve out a career as a PA officer as in the other three services.
In fact, too much time spent as a PAO is a career inhibitor. By making
PA a branch and giving it the respect and rank that the other career fields
enjoy, the field would attract better-qualified personnel resulting in
a better quality product. Although there is a move underway to change PA’s
designation, without the support of the leadership, PA will continue to
be viewed as a second-rate career field. And even though the Air Force,
Navy and Marines classify PA as a career field (the Army does not), the
task of legitimizing PA’s status is a DOD-wide challenge because many servicemembers
are not even aware that PA is a job.
Long-term Internal
The first
long-term internal objective is to develop training videos for leadership
courses based on internal and external feedback. This diffusion strategy
encourages adoption through inclusion, meaning that a person is more likely
to adopt an idea if they were part of it and/or had input (Rogers, 1986).
The training will be tailored to fit the leadership course and level any
existing training will be audited and modified appropriately.
Once the
training development is complete, the second objective is to get the PA
leadership to market the training to DOD leaders and the selected leadership
schools. To do this, the positive and negative consequences of adopting
and not adopting will be communicated. An additional objective is
to provide videos of the training to PAOs throughout the commands so they
can provide their leadership with the information at their convenience.
The final,
but perhaps the most important objective in this section is to develop
a DOD-wide training outline for all PA practitioners. Oftentimes servicemembers
and civilians throughout the DOD are well into their PA careers with little
or no PA training. This only increases the potential for mistakes and reduces
the credibility of the profession. In many cases, individuals are awarded
the PA designator without having any experience or training. Since this
is an internal problem it can be easily fixed by requiring specific training
prior to awarding the PA designation as is the case in most other military
professions.
Long-Term External
The long-term
external objective involves DODs implementation of the PA training in selected
leadership courses—officer’s basic courses and E-6 through 8 enlisted leadership
courses at a minimum. This will increase awareness of PA and the roles,
uses and management of PA assets thereby reducing misunderstanding and
misuse.
Measures
for success
The measures for success are based on objectives that could reasonably
be accomplished within a three-year time frame. The measures are also those
objectives that will provide the most return for the resources expended.
These measures assume DOD has concurred with the experiment and that it
is completed. The measurements for success are:
-
Brief PA general officers on
experimen
-
Address all four services’ Worldwide
PA conferences
-
PA awareness spots run on AFRTS radio
and television networks
-
The reserve course opens to active-duty
leaders assigned PA as an additional duty
-
PAOs receive required training prior
to attaining the PA designator
Conclusion
Regardless of the research results, the pilot study and the personal experiences
of Allen et al. suggest that the PA community has a credibility problem.
In addition, it is also likely that the research will conclude that a credibility
gap exists. The answer to the research question, “Does PA have a
credibility problem?” is one very much worth answering. But with
the answer comes many more questions for future consideration, such as
does one service have a better PA program than the others? Or will
the proposals in this literature address and repair the problem? If not
what is the fix? What are the costs and savings to the military if the
problem persists or is remedied? How did the problem initially develop
and what steps can be taken to avoid it in the future? Why has it
not been addressed previously and what are the short and long-term effects
of the problem. Whatever the answers to these questions, one conclusion
was reached during the research and that is there is a lack of research
in this area. There are theories to support the research proposals,
but specific research on image building or credibility repair for professions
is noticeably lacking.
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