Conditions--the setting, the stage for the phenomenon or event,
the preexisting factors
For example: in the case of a forest fire,
high temperatures and lack of rain would be conditions
Influences--these affect the rate or degree of the phenomenon,
they intensify or moderate it
For example: cheerleaders may intensify the
energy of the players and, therefore, indirectly influence the outcome
of a game
Precipitating Cause--forces the phenomenon to happen, this is
the "last straw" idea, usually happens just before the phenomenon occurs
For example: in the case of a forest fire, the bolt
of lightning would be the precipitating cause
Remote Causes--the causes are remote in time, they are causes
of causes
For example: the Great Wall of China led to
the fall of Rome!
Proximate Causes--these are close in time to the phenomenon,
there are usually several proximate causes
For example: one cause of low voter
turnout could be bad weather on the day of the election, the energy crisis
in CA occurred around Christmas time when
many people had light displays for the holidays and the weather was cold
Necessary Causes--these must exist in order for the phenomenon
to happen, but their existence does not mean the phenomenon will always
occur, the absence of any deterrent is also a kind of necessary cause
For example: oxygen is necessary for fire
to occur, the forest fire might not have spread if firebreaks had been
constructed
Sufficient Causes--these are all the possible causes, any one
of these could have caused the phenomenon, most sufficient causes are not
necessary causes
For example: sufficient causes of death are
stroke, heart attack, strangulation
Absence of a Blocking Cause
For example: the house burned down
because the fire engine couldn't get to it in time
Reciprocal Causes
For example: consumer demand leads to new products
which in turn lead to more consumer demand
Chance--the unexpected co-occurrence of events that each have
their own causes, some chance is random, some chance can be expressed as
a statistical probability
The ideas for this page were taken from A Rhetoric of Argument
2nd. ed. by Jeanne Fahnestock and Marie Secor
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