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Discussion
-- Analysis
-- Solutions
Conclusion
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"The single
most critical problem facing many a professional today is the problem of
lost credibility."
William A. Durbin
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Introduction
As gatekeepers of information for the U.S. Military,
the credibility of military public affairs is vital to remain trustworthy
in the eyes of the media and more importantly, the American people. If
credibility is lost, the media may no longer look to military public affairs
officials for accurate and timely information. Instead, they will search
elsewhere, seeking to "climb the fence" instead of passing through the
public affairs gate. Maintaining this credibility is difficult because
it is necessary to participate in deception during the course of the military
public affairs personnel’s duties. To maintain these two seemingly conflicting
policies (deception and credibility) warrants investigation, explanation,
and discussion.
Since the United States Civil War and earlier, U.S.
Armed Forces have used deception to outwit opponents, win battles and triumph
in war. In the summer of 1862, the Confederate Army was able to deceive
the Union Army into thinking they faced a much larger force than existed.
The Confederates did this in part by planting disinformation in the Richmond,
Va., newspaper and by shifting troops from one side of a line to the other.
Subsequently, the U.S. military continues a policy of deception through
such things as psychological operations, targeting enemy forces, and withholding
information to aid in secrecy of operations. As gatekeepers of information,
military public affairs must temper the conflict between providing a steady
and reliable flow of information to the media while preserving military
deception (as an active participant in that deception) and maintaining
credibility.
The study of deception has been studied extensively.
Knapp and Comadena (1979), argue that "the conscious alteration of information
a person believes to be true in order to significantly change another’s
perceptions from what the deceiver thought they would be without alteration,"
(O’Hair & Cody, 1994).
Theoretical
Rational
Organizational Theory
In the systems framework, an organization is conceptualized
as having a definite boundary through which environmental input and output
flows. It strives to maintain this boundary in order to maintain its own
distinctive survival as an entity (Clegg, 1990). Public affairs rests on
the military organization’s boundary and public affairs professionals work
as the gatekeepers of information with the media. The desire to ensure
the military’s survival poses a conflict for public affairs between the
need to use deception practices--collaborative deception, concealment,
omission of facts, and evasion--and the need to maintain credibility with
the media.
The quest to respond to a changing environment and
manage complex systems makes organizations an essential and inescapable
feature (Clegg, 1990) and the military is no exception. Military structure
follows the classical theory of organization. Classical organizational
theorists do not see communication as problematic; they view it primarily
as a tool for issuing orders, coordinating work, and gaining worker compliance.
Eisenberg and Goodall (1993) elaborate on the classical theory. They explain
how, in the rationalized and hierarchical world, the only type of communication
that matters is that which carries the correct information through the
proper channels. This is a good description of military communication and
public affairs’ inclination to use deception strategy and is a byproduct
of its place within this bureaucracy. When the commander says to deceive,
either directly or indirectly, the public affairs officer (PAO) may advise
otherwise, but the commander gets what he/she wants.
Deception Theory
Public affairs can better understand the reasons
for deception, and the ethical considerations by observing the O’Hair/Cody
Model of Deception. O’Hair and Cody use this model to describe the motives
of deception as exploitation, egoism, benevolence, malevolence, utility,
and regress. The predicted consequences a person may consider before using
deception include detection potential; harm to target and third party;
loss of trust and respect; relational costs; and positive consequences.
The ethical and moral considerations, or groundings, this method discusses
are: (1) deception is unethical, (2) it is a means of survival, or (3)
it is used as the situation determines. Actions used to deceive include
lying, evasion, overstatement, concealment, and collusion. The model also
identifies behaviors associated with deception and honesty. People who
are friendly, attentive, precise in their delivery, and use low drama in
their presentations are considered most honest.
Credibility
"The single most critical problem facing
many a professional today is the problem of lost credibility."
William A. Durbin, 1975 (Hill
and Knowlton Executives, 1975, p. 219).
Credibility resides in the eye of the beholder (Infant,
Rancer, & Womack, 1997). That is, credibility is a perception by an
audience. The ultimate impact on the receiver rests on what they attribute
to their communication sources. Receivers attribute high, medium, or low
credibility to people, organizations, church, military, and institutions
that are forms of communication sources. Meanings, values, beliefs, and
attitudes are characteristics people attributed to messages. Therefore,
messages are perceptual, and thus care must be taken in assuming that a
person "has" meaning, or "holds" credibility. With these cautions in mind,
generalizations can be made about communication and how it works.
Another principle in credibility is that a change
of attitude depends on how credible the receiver believes the communication
source to be. Source credibility is an area of ongoing research in communication.
Public figures, leaders, and peers can be assessed objectively and precisely
in terms of their perceived credibility. Communication researchers have
found that credibility is essentially composed of the degree of competence,
character, composure, sociability, and extroversion attributed to sources
of communication. Thus, people tend to change their attitudes more readily
as they attribute more competence, trustworthiness, composure, sociability,
and extroversion to their sources of communication. Also, receivers tend
to attribute low credibility to people or organizations that are different
from their own norms, values, beliefs and attitudes (Cummings & Somervill,
1981).
Uncertainty Reduction Theory
Uncertainty reduction is motivation for much of the
communication that takes place between people and it may illuminate the
solution to public affairs’ desire to maintain credibility in light of
the need to use deception strategies to safeguard sensitive information.
The less uncertain people feel about those with whom they are dealing,
the more comfortable they become communicating. The need for uncertainty
reduction is heightened if one or more communicators display abnormal behavior,
if future communication is expected, or if there is a perception of a strong
reward and/or punishment power associated with the individual (Infante,
Rancer, & Womack , 1997).
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Introduction
-- Theories
Conclusion..
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"Close contact
and association with civilians should be encouraged and maintained, since
a citizens’ army is a result of combined interest, effort, and contribution
of both military and public."
The Doolittle
Board
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"Don’t lie
to me. You don’t always have to tell me everything, but don’t hype it either.
If we think you're always hyping, we are not going to take you seriously
and you won’t have credibility."
Wolf Blitzer
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"To win one hundred victories
in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without
fighting is the acme of skill."
Sun Tzu
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Discussion
Analysis
The communication phenomena of concern to this study
are between military public affairs personnel and media representatives.
As previously stated, if media representatives do not feel they are getting
complete information, or that information is accurate, they will find sources
other than military public affairs. When media find other sources and receive
information the public affairs office was not able to release, credibility
is lost. The suggested solution for the problem of maintaining credibility
while using deception is a two-step process. First, military public affairs
personnel will use deception only when absolutely necessary. Second, the
media will be indoctrinated on the release restraints facing military public
affairs.
Military public affairs continue to face the problem
of being perceived as purveyors of deception. A consequence of this perception
is low credibility with the media. The purpose of this research is to determine
methods military public affairs personnel use to maintain credibility with
the media while regularly using deception strategies.
Next, credibility is examined as to its importance
and difficulty to maintain. Achieving credibility with the media must be
a goal with any public affairs office, but this can be a difficult task
when facing a biased media (Arnold, 1973). However, any message the command
intends to relay to the public will be contaminated by a perceived bias
of media representatives attending a news conference or reading a news
release. The media recognizes public affairs as military members and expects
public affairs to have a vested interest in the entity it talks about (Arnold,
1973). An example would be a message concerning the latest warfighting
equipment under development in the United States. If the command approaches
the news conference with the intent of telling how the equipment will be
technologically advanced over a rival country’s, the media may already
be skeptical of the message because the command and public affairs have
a vested interest in the development and acquisition of the equipment.
Likewise, a member of the military attempting to relay a message that the
United States is not trying to bomb the civilians of Iraq will have a harder
time convincing the media than a foreign affairs scholar at the University
of Oklahoma saying the same thing. The scholar does not have a (perceived)
vested interest in the outcome of the bombing and will be more convincing
(Arnold, 1973).
Nonverbal communication plays a key role in credibility
also. It must match the message being conveyed (Singletary, 1976). If the
message indicates everything is fine, the sender is sweating visibly or
shaking uncontrollably, chances are the audience is not going to take the
message seriously. Nonverbal communication must indicate the power of the
message. Attractiveness accounts for a large part of credibility. If the
sender’s message comes across with a warm, personable, and pleasant appearance,
it is more likely to be perceived as more credible (Singletary, 1976).
Prior credibility of the military public affairs
office to the media is also a concern. If past messages have led the media
to believe information has been withheld, incomplete, or off the subject,
attempts to pass on a credible message will become more difficult with
each successive attempt. With lack of credibility, persuasiveness is also
lost. To regain credibility, it is important to include evidence of the
position taken, testimony from others with knowledge of the subject, and
prestige-references (people known to provide credible information to the
media in the past). It is also important to deliver explicit statements
whenever possible to regain the media’s trust. This means giving truthful
statements that can be verified and believed by the audience (Wheeless,
1973). If a communicator is already perceived as highly credible, his or
her assertions will be accepted as accurate. Bringing in others to strengthen
opinion or presenting facts from an outside source is perceived as redundant.
People who do not have a high level of credibility, however, would prosper
by bringing in outside sources to serve as a reinforcement to increase
their credibility level. An example could be a news conference or news
release that identifies an environmental spill on a military reservation.
If prior messages were perceived as trustworthy, a message of containment
with little or no damage to the local environment would be taken as the
truth in most cases. On the other hand, if credibility is in doubt, the
same message could be viewed as a cover-up and an alternate source might
be sought.
Why worry about credibility? Results of studies have
shown receivers can tell whether evidence being provided is relevant to
the issue or not. They can also distinguish between credible sources of
information and those that are not. Evidence provided by a credible source
results in more attitude change as well as lending support for the stated
position. Relevant evidence from a credible source does much in the way
of gaining audience support. Poor evidence will hurt a position whether
the communicator has high or low credibility (Luchok & McCroskey, 1978).
Credibility is important and yet difficult to maintain.
Maintaining credibility with the media must be a priority with any public
affairs office. Media have a biased perception of any message the command
intends to relay which reduces the credibility of the commander and public
affairs office. The reason the message is received with some form of bias
is because the public affairs office is noted to have a vested interest
in the subject (Arnold, 1973).
An example would be messages command would want to
put out on the latest warfighting aircraft under development in the United
States. If the command approaches the news conference with the intent of
telling how the new equipment will be technologically advanced over a rival
country’s, the media will already be skeptical of the message because the
command has a vested interest in the development and acquisition of this
equipment.
As important as recognizing the fact that there will
be perceived bias by the media to a public affairs message, the presentation
of the information is just as important. One of the leading factors within
the presentation of information are nonverbal messages sent by speakers.
Nonverbal communication must consistently match the message. If a speaker
is relaying a message to the audience that everything is going smoothly
with a current operation, but sweat is running down his/her forehead and
the person is obviously shaking uncontrollably, chances are the audience
is not going to take the message in the context meant to be understood.
Nonverbal actions must indicate the power of the message (Arnold, 1973).
Credibility, in this sense, means the willingness
of the audience to believe the public affairs message will depend upon
several distinguishable characteristics visible by the speaker. If the
speaker presents an educated, informed, and interpretive appearance while
delivering a presentation, the speaker would portray the characteristic
of being knowledgeable. Presenting a discussion using humor and talking
in a pleasant voice, while being well groomed and neat would add attraction
characteristics. Trustworthiness is gained when the speaker is thorough,
objective, and comes across as open-minded. Being able to deliver the message
in a clear, concise and comprehensive manner also aids the speaker by lending
the characteristic of articulation to the presentation (Singletary, 1976).
Considering and adding these characteristics when delivering a presentation
to the media usually adds to the credibility of the speaker. However, because
a speaker exhibits many of the characteristics, does not mean the message
is perceived as the speaker intends.
There may be more than one audience to the presentation
in some cases. For example, if the media perceives the message as credible,
it is possible another branch of the armed forces could view the message
as hostile toward its position or take the message in a different context.
The credibility of the message could be completely lost on other audiences
(Singletary, 1976).
For instance, if command was convening a news conference
on the capability of a new weapon system that would greatly enhance the
capability of the service holding the presentation, but adversely affect
the budget allotment of another service, the other service would view the
message as competition. The media could take the message at face value
and give glowing praise in the news programs or in print, but the rival
service could be spreading a message of another weapon system that was
more capable on the battlefield in an attempt to shift budget money to
its project. The rival service may be perceived as attacking the capabilities
described in the news conference as false, or as half truth, thereby casting
doubt on the message.
Another way credibility is lost is by improper use
of deception strategies. Turner, Edgley and Olmstead (1975) indicate that
at the core of this communication perspective is the assumption that people
control the information they present in their messages (Buller & Burgoon
1994). As such, deception is used throughout people’s lives. People at
large must consider what types, how and in what order information is being
communicated when they manage impressions, negotiate conversations, comfort
others, gain compliance, express affinity, adapt to another culture, respond
to others, resolve conflict and seek additional information (Buller &
Burgoon, 1985).
An important consideration in this process of communication
is whether to send information that is entirely honest or to modify it
in some way that departs from the truth as the source knows it. Most conversations
rest on the assumption of veracity in information exchange,(Buller &
Burgoon, 1994). Turner et. al (1975), states that 62% of conversation exhibits
information that could be classified as deception. According to that study,
there are five types of deceptive acts and it also points out that their
average of occurrence in conversations: (1) Lies--30%; (2) Exaggerations--5%;
(3) Half-truths--29%; (4) Secrets--3%; (5) Diversionary--32% (Buller &
Burgoon, 1994). Mets and Chronis (1986), came up with three types of deceptive
acts. They are falsification, half-truths and concealment. The averages
of occurrences were 48%, 27% and 23%, respectively. (Buller & Burgoon,
1985).
However, an argument can be made that perhaps people
indulge in deception so frequently, at least in part, because it is easy.
According to McCornack and Parks (1986), people tend to have difficulty
detecting deception because of their inherent belief that people are telling
the truth under most interpersonal circumstances. As such, people’s tendency
to believe others might prevent them from noticing deception signs or hints.
Other explanations offer that truth bias makes communication easier and
helps maintain relationships. Kraut and Higgins (1984), proposed that truth
bias is assumed and is a fundamental part of most conversations (Millar
& Millar, 1997). Buller and Burgoon (1994), stated that deceptive people
decide honesty is not the best communication strategy. Instead, they partake
in deceptive communication to achieve desired outcome.
Although most study of deception has mostly involved
interpersonal communication, propaganda can be seen as a form of deception
in mass communication. When people see a political campaign ad or a prepared
statement by a public relations person, the public assumes such communication
is propaganda. Propaganda works because it is integrated into people’s
habits of communication. These habits are valued and hold the promise of
desired outcomes in people’s lives. Sociologist George Simmel described
this as association, the cultivation of social relations that help people
define, and do, what is wanted of them (Combs & Nimo, 1993).
Propaganda, however, is not limited to the political
arena. In contemporary diplomatic cultures forms of propaganda are also
practiced. The expected outcome is winning or influencing. "To
win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill.
To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill," wrote Sun
Tzu, a Chinese scholar Combs & Nimo, 1993, p. 124). The enemy,
thought Tzu, is deceived by creating shapes or images. Although diplomacy,
the art and practice of conducting international relations, involves the
exchange of information, preferences, and views in negotiating treaties,
alliances and agreements, it also involves the exchange of shapes, illusions
or images. The Monroe Doctrine provides an example of this. This presidential
pronouncement had little force to back it, yet was reaffirmed for more
than a century. It was less fact than shape, less policy than image (Combs
& Nimo, 1993).
In World War I, two fledging industries, broadcasting
and motion pictures, were first exploited for their propaganda potential.
These media gave audiences a sense of immediacy. More recently, the Gulf
War included war propaganda, i.e., using disinformation, demonizing the
enemy, accusing them of atrocities, attempting to harm the morale or the
resolve of the enemy through broadcasts and leaflets, drumming up support
and condemning dissent at home. Other propaganda included branding inquiring
reporters and doubtful politicians as traitors, and attempting to mobilize
public opinion into a mood of acceptance that no other alternative was
possible ... building up a popular war fever (Combs & Nimo, 1993).
Judging from the literature that is now beginning
to emerge from both trade and academic presses, the Gulf War was viewed
with stunned fascination as the first true real-time "televised war." The
war brought an unexpected realization of many years of media punditry about
the potential role of new communication technologies to create a postmodern
"global village." The war’s relatively short duration meant that events
could be seen in their entirety, unfolding before their audience. The flow
of information was kept tightly under the control of the Bush administration
(Steiner, 1994).
Unlike previous wars, such as World War II, certain
sections of the press, especially the smaller independent publications,
were quite eager to challenge attempts by the military or the administration
to propagandize through lies and deceit. Unfortunately, as with most propaganda
activities, much of this was not revealed until after the propaganda had
done its work. The use of atrocity stories as a propaganda tool to gain
sympathy and to vilify the enemy is probably one of the oldest psychological
warfare stratagems known; it is traceable at least back to the Crusades,
(Taylor, 1990). The story about Iraqi soldiers in Kuwait removing babies
from incubators and leaving them on the floor to die surfaced first in
British newspapers in September 1990 and spread to the United States almost
immediately (Steiner, 1994).
Shortly thereafter, the story resurfaced at the Human
Rights Caucus where a 15-year-old girl known only as Nayirah (her last
named concealed for fear of reprisals to her family) gave a moving and
teary testimony to this horrific account. It was only after the war ended
that the unidentified girl was found to be the daughter of the Kuwaiti
ambassador to the United States and the massive deception began to unravel
(Steiner, 1994).
Apparently, the girl had been extensively coached
by the public relations firm of Hill & Knowlton, which was paid $10
million for its professional services by a group known as the Citizens
for a Free Kuwait. It was no coincidence that Hill & Knowlton’s Washington
president, Craig Fuller, had been George Bush’s chief of staff. Apart from
organizing rallies on college campuses and providing informational press
kits to the news media, one of the major functions of Hill & Knowlton
was to bring about a massive shift in public opinion in favor of liberating
Kuwait. It was part of an elaborate web of deception, disinformation, and
lies to sell the war to the public. The U.S. president, vice president
and top military leaders were revealed to be propagandists who did not
hesitate to repeat lies over and over in order to win support for the war
effort (Steiner, 1994).
Although deception brings connotations of wrong doing
on the part of the user, whether it be in an interpersonal or in a mass
media context, research supports deception strategy as a common and acceptable
form of communication if American lives are being saved from enemy attack.
Such omission of information (troop formations), albeit deception, is justified.
The reason for a deceptive strategy can range from protecting a service
member’s home address to not divulging administrative action albeit punitive
in nature all the way from protecting or concealing information to safeguarding
operational and national security interests. Instances in the use of deception
are not up to the public affairs officer, but are up to law, regulation,
and command discretion that is represented in the Classical Theory model
of the military institution previously discussed. As such, ethical considerations/perceptions
are paramount. It is important to note that while deception has been discussed
from an acceptable communication strategy within the framework of public
affairs work, this research project does not attempt to correlate deceptive
strategy with psychological operations, which intentionally lies and makes
a concentrated effort to dupe the enemy.
Even though regulations and guidance determine what
information can be released, they may appear contradictory in nature as
is evident in the Joint Doctrine …
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Deception operations will not intentionally target
or mislead the U.S. public, the U.S. Congress, or the U.S. news media.
Misinforming the media about military capabilities and intentions in ways
that influence U.S. decision makers and public opinion is contrary to DOD
policy.
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Deception operations that have activities potentially
visible to the media or the public should be coordinated with the appropriate
public affairs officers to identify any potential problems. Coordination
will reduce the chance that public affairs officers will inadvertently
reveal information that could undermine ongoing or planned deception operations
(Patrick, 1994).
Not all military regulations, laws, doctrine, and
guidance are contradictory. They are the substance and backbone behind
the military and it’s mission to protect and defend.
Solutions
"Don’t lie to me.
You don’t always have to tell me everything, but don’t hype it either.
If we think you're always hyping, we are not going to take you seriously
and you won’t have credibility."
Wolf Blitzer,
CNN correspondent (Public Relations Tactics, 1998, p. 18)
Awad (1985) advises that the mystery of public affairs
be removed. He continues by saying all public affairs activities should
be able to stand in the open and public affairs people need to convince
their clients of the need for openness and accessibility, prompt and accurate
response, and cooperation with the media.
National defense issues and other special circumstances
prevent the military from being able to accomplish this, but Awad’s goal
is still worth approaching. Military public affairs must minimize deception
use to absolutely necessary situations in order to maintain credibility
with the media. The military, by nature of its purpose, has a need to safeguard
information. To maintain credibility with the media, however, it must be
able to articulate why certain information is not releasable. Ferr and
Willihnganz (1991) quote public relations practitioner Marvin N. Olasky
who said public affairs must "either tell the truth, or tell people when
information is none of their business (p. 9)." By being up front with the
media and explaining the reasons why information cannot be released and
gaining the media’s acceptance of this, public affairs makes the media
a party to its own deceptions--that is the withholding of information.
Making the media a part of public affairs’ attempt to protect the interests
of the United States and its military members is a key strategy suggested
by the Doolittle Board (Cutlip & Center,
1971, p. 627) shortly after World War I. "The study recommended: "Close
contact and association with civilians should be encouraged and maintained,
since a citizens’ army is a result of combined interest, effort, and contribution
of both military and public." This study laid the foundation for military
community relations programs, but the concept is applicable to media relations
as well.
Training is the key to implementing these solutions.
Public affairs people must be trained to use deception only when absolutely
necessary. Communication theories concerning credibility, deception, and
uncertainty reduction can be added to curricula of established public affairs
training courses. These courses include entry-level journalism courses,
senior noncommissioned officer and officer joint courses, annual workshops
and conferences, correspondence courses and public affairs guidance. Media
training is an intricate and encompassing part of military public affairs
training. Therefore, added emphasis on the use of deception in media training
can be targeted. With the inclusion of the O’Hair/Cody model of deception,
military public affairs professionals will be able to easily identify that
deception is a part of their job and learn to limit its use.
In order to minimize deception and maintain credibility
with the media, military public affairs must be as proactive as possible.
The following case study (Canfield, 1968) illustrates this point. In the
early morning of April 1963, the U.S.S. Thresher, one of the U.S. Navy’s
quietest, fastest and deepest-diving nuclear submarines was lost at sea.
The Navy’s Office of Information had three objectives in this disaster:
(1) maintain public confidence and avoid speculation and false or misleading
rumors; (2) protect the interests of the next of kin of personnel involved,
and try not to cause undue anguish or create false hope; (3) establish
and maintain good press relations by supplying media representatives with
fast, accurate information, making every effort to give them the fullest
possible coverage of the disaster consistent with security regulations.
A decision was made to delay notification of next
of kin until 7:50 p.m. that evening to minimize the chance that the problem
was less severe. Naval public affairs did not wait until then to begin
preparations for media interest however, so when the first news query was
received at 6:55 p.m., they were prepared. The media call accelerated the
plan to notify next of kin by 20 minutes and at 8 p.m. the first press
conference was held. Public affairs had already prepared an initial statement,
gathered background material, unclassified photos and film footage of the
submarine, and biographies and photos of crew members.
The Navy’s quick action during the initial hours
of the disaster and its steady support of other media activities up to
the memorial service resulted in the achievement of all three goals. Regarding
the third goal in particular, media representatives later stated that the
flow of information during the emergency was without precedent. As a result,
the Navy was able to forestall the public’s fear of radioactive contamination,
prevent confidence in the submarine program from being eroded, gain needed
public support and cooperation, and ensure next of kin were not troubled
more than necessary.
Equally important to a proactive military public
affairs program is the need to educate the media on the military’s restraints
in releasing information. This effort to train and educate the media on
restrictions of military public affairs greatly increases public affairs
credibility. Uncertainty reduction theory is the basis of this assumption.
The most important message to get to the media is that public affairs guidance,
military regulations, and commanders decide what can be released in the
best interest of national or operational security.
Blitzer also advises, "develop personal relationships
with people like me. If you have a personal contact with a reporter, your
almost always going to have a sympathetic ear (Public Relations Society,
1998, p. 18)."
There are many ways to reach out and educate the
media. Military installations hold media events and invite the local media
to visit, receive tours and meet the commander. This gives the media an
opportunity to learn how public affairs works and gain a vision of the
mission of the installation. Military public affairs must also show a concerted
effort by providing as much information as possible and follow up with
the media representative to ensure they receive everything they need.
There is no way an organization can walk away from
a crisis totally unscathed, but there are ways to minimize the damage.
The Public Relations Society Association offers some innovative tips:
 ..Do
not go off half-cocked: Everything that is said to a reporter is on the
record, at all times. If the public affairs officer doesn’t want to see
it in print or on the prime time news, then don’t say it.
..Be
as honest as possible: There is no requirement to tell all about the organization
or crisis, as long as what you say is the truth.
..Show
compassion: If death or injury occur, feel free to show sorrow and sensitivity.
The organization does not have to admit liability, but demonstrating humanity
goes a long way.
..Do
not be defensive: Defensiveness implies guilt. Do not do it.
..Think
like the public: Always remember that impression given to the public is
better than being right.
..Communicate
Organizational values: Reiterate what the organization stands for. Ensure
those principles are known. The organizational credo should be the basis
of the communication strategy.
..Dare
to respond in kind: If the organization is being accused of withholding
information (if it is true), the logical tactic would be to explain why.
Feel free to cite protection of privacy issue, etc. etc.
..Know
when to turn to hero: When StarKist tuna was publicly bombarded by activists,
the organization adopted a new dolphin-free tuna. As a result, the activist
championed StarKist for its policy which set the new standard for its rival
tuna companies. If you can fix it, fix it and so state.
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Maintaining
Credibility Within Military Public Affairs While Preserving and Participating
in Military Deception